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NOTES
THE DUTY OF NEWSPAPERS TO ACCEPT POLITICAL
ADVERTISING - AN ATTACK ON TRADITION
A subject of current concern and controversy' is the imposition of
greater obligations on newspapers to see that competing views are given
a forum. With one authority to the contrary, the courts have tradition-
1. In an unusually provocative article Professor Jerome Barron has recently
argued that the "marketplace of ideas" theory of the eighteenth century is a romantic
conception today in view of the twentieth century monopoly newspaper, and an affirma-
tive "right of access" to the press should be created so that novel and unconventional
ideas are able to receive a forum. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
The article resulted in the extension of an invitation to Professor Barron to
address an American Civil Liberties Union gathering. The address was apparently
accorded favorable reception. See G. Cranberg, New Look at the First Amendment,
SATURDAY REVIEW, Sept. 14, 1968 at 136-37, wherein it is noted that ironically the
American Civil Liberties Union, usually the most vocal opponent of any governmental
interference in the "free marketplace of ideas," has supported the bringing of law suits
to challenge discriminatory refusal of advertisements and to establish affirmative
access to the press. Mr. Cranberg, editorial writer for the Des Moines, Iowa, Register
and Tribune, feels that governmental action would be expressly forbidden by the first
amendment.
A recent ACLU workshop reported that:
[I]t was established that minority groups and proponents of unpopular
causes are frequently denied access to the press. Examples of such denials
included: a Southern paper which refuses to print obituaries of Negroes,
refusals to accept paid advertisements opposing the Vietnam war, systematic
omission of news about particular issues, individuals, or organizations, and
publication of attacks on individuals or organizations without affording any
opportunity to reply.
American Civil Liberties Union Workshop on Newspapers and Magazines report,
quoted in SATURDAY REVIEW, Sept. 14, 1968, at 136.
Conventional works, such as A. DRURY, CAPABLE OF HONOR (1966), have pointed
out the role which the press may play in distorting truth. Moreover, the small circulation
"left-wing" press contains countless claims of collusive denials of a forum. For example,
author Mark Lane has maintained that publication of his best-selling attack on the
Warren Commission Report has resulted in complete exclusion from the news media of
his subsequent comments on the issue, and New Orleans District Attorney James
Garrison has maintained that the granting of a federal injunction preventing his
prosecution of an alleged conspirator in the assassination of President Kennedy was
not reported by news media. Los Angeles Free Press, July 7, 1968. Mr. Lane has
alleged that an editor of the New York Times, when queried as to the failure of that
paper to report issuance of the injunction against Mr. Garrison, responded by checking
recent issues of the Times and notifying his inquisitor that since no pertinent story had
appeared in the Times no such injunction could have been granted. Id. For further
allegations of an attempt by wire services to exclude news of recent developments
pertinent to the assassination of the late President, see Los Angeles Free Press, Dec. 22,
1967, Sept. 11, 1968, and Aug. 30, 1968. Evidently the frustration reflected in the pages of
the left-wing press is ripening into lawsuits. See note 18 infra.
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRESS
ally refused to fashion a "right of access"2 to the press.8 Characterizing
the newspaper as a private enterprise, the courts have upheld the news-
paper's right to refuse publication of- material unacceptable by its
standards.
The framers of the Constitution were acutely aware of dangers
inherent in governmental interference with and censorship of the press.
However, with the advent of technological advancements in mass com-
munication, the transformation of newspapers from pamphlets to nation-
wide dailies requires a reappraisal of the notion of freedom of the press.
As the collapse of the laissez-faire system in economics necessitated
governmental intervention, obstructions to free discussion may also re-
quire affirmative action.
The breakdown of laissez-faire extends not only to the
economic but to other spheres, and our system of free enter-
prise is no longer self-operating. The complexities of modern
society have introduced into the free marketplace of ideas
blockages and distortions that can only be removed by affirm-
ative social controls. The situation is indeed paradoxical. Free-
dom of expression is by its very nature laissez-faire; it implies
absence of government control. Yet the conditions under which
freedom of expression can successfully operate in modern so-
ciety require more and more governmental regulation.4
This note will examine and evaluate various rationale for any
conclusion that should be reached in this area. The discussion will be
framed in the context of the first amendment. However, first amendment
arguments prove to be a two-edged sword: they can be justifications
2. Barron, supra note 1.
3. Some of the more recent cases are J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram
Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961) ; Bloss v. Federated Publications,
Inc., 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968); Poughkeepsie Buying Service v.
Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1963); Mid-West Elec.
Co-op, Inc. v. West Texas Chamber of Commerce, 369 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1963).
An especially relevant decision is Lord v. Winchester Star, Inc., 346 Mass. 764,
190 N.E.2d 875 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 221 (1964) ; discussed in Barron, supra
note 1, at 1669, involving the refusal of the town's newspaper to print a letter to the
editor from a local attorney who took a position opposing the newspaper on a local
matter.
The sole authority to the contrary is Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. 225, 31
Ohio Dec. 54 (1919). Three competing merchants were keeping a fourth from advertising.
The court held that newspapers have acquired a quasi-public character which requires
that when it has advertising space to sell and the advertiser has complied with the law
and the reasonable rules of the company as to the kind and character of the advertise-
ment offered, then the company is bound to accept the advertisement. This case has
been explicitly rejected by other courts.
4. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 902 (1964).
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against imposing restrictions on the press to preserve the "free market-
place of ideas,"5 or rationale for regulation to remove impediments to
discussion.
CREATION OF A RIGHT OF ACCESS
Public Expression
Recent court decisions in other areas may be useful as analogues to
justify imposing greater obligations on newspapers.
In Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority,' a member of
"Students for a Democratic Society" sought a declaratory judgment
requiring the defendant, the New York City Transit Authority, to
accept for display on the walls in New York City subway station plat-
forms two posters opposing United States participation in the war in
Vietnam.7 The court held that freedom of speech protection extended to
the posters and in order to justify a refusal to exhibit them, the Authority
had to show that the posters would present a "clear and present danger. '
The court also ruled that whether the posters would seriously endanger
safety in the subways was a question of fact that would only be resolved
at trial.
In Niemotko v. Maryland,9 members of Jehovah's Witnesses had
their conviction of disorderly conduct overturned as a violation of their
constitutional rights of free speech and religion. The court found the
conviction based, not upon evidence of disorder, or threats of violence or
riot, but on the fact that the defendants had used a public park for Bible
talks without a permit, their application for a permit having been denied
by municipal authorities in exercise of a power derived, not from a
statute or ordinance, but from a local practice not defining any standards
or limitations.
5. Barron, supra note 1.
6. 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
7. The posters contain a picture of a child with a scarred back and arm with the
following words in large lettering:
WHY ARE WE BURNING, TORTURING, KILLING, THE PEOPLE
OF VIETNAM -TO PREVENT FREE ELECTIONS
In smaller lettering the posters continue:
PROTEST this anti-democratic war
WRITE President Lyndon B. Johnson, The White House, Washington, D.C.
GET THE STRAIGHT FACTS
WRITE
Students for a Democratic Society
119 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003
In small print the poster states:
This 10-year-old girl was -burned by napalm bombs.
8. This was the first amendment test used in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
9. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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Wolin v. Port of New York Authority"° held that refusing to allow
a group opposed to the war in Vietnam to pass out leaflets in the Ter-
minal Building operated by the Port of New York Authority was an
abridgment of the group's first amendment freedoms. In deciding whether
the Terminal was an appropriate place for political expression the
court framed the issue in the following manner:
[w]here the issue involves the exercise of first amendment
rights in a place clearly available to the general public, the
inquiry must go further: does the character of the place, the
pattern of usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and
the population who take advantage of the general invitation
extended make it an appropriate place for communication of
views on issues of political and social significance. The factors
to be considered are essentially the same, be the forum selected
for expression a street, park, shopping center, bus terminal
or office plaza."
The terminal building had been used by glee clubs, charity solicitors and
automobile exhibitors in the past. To allow these types of activities yet
deny a forum for political expression would be an illogical result. 2
In rejecting the argument that Wolin's message bore no special
relation to the operation of the terminal the court gave two indices of
relevance: either the place should represent the object of protest, the
seat of authority against which the protest is directed, or the place should
be where the relevant audience may be found."8 The propriety of the
terminal's use was justified on the latter ground, as Wolin's message
was directed to the public at large.
If the rationale of Kissinger, Niemotko and Wolin were applied to
newspapers, then, arguably, a right of access would follow. Kissinger
and Niemnotko hold that first amendment rights cannot be abridged by
the state, yet newspapers seem to be able arbitrarily to refuse to accept
any advertisement, unchecked by any standards or limitations.'4 If the
Wolin measure of appropriateness of use as a forum for public issues is
applied, then newspapers, society's traditional vehicle for opinions, would
certainly qualify. Access to print one's views in a newspaper seems to be
as important as opportunities to expound them in public buildings or
10. 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
11. Id. at 89.
12. Id. at 90.
13. Id.
14. A publisher of a newspaper who enjoys a virtual monopoly in a given area
may refuse to accept an advertisement if he sees fit to do so. J.J. Gordon, Inc. v.
Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961).
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parks.
However, since newspapers are privately owned, their refusal to
print advertisements would not appear to be the requisite "state action"'5
involved in exclusion from a public building or park. In Dorsey v. Stuyve-
sant Corp.,"8 the corporation undertook the rehabilitation of a sub-
standard area by constructing new housing under a contract with the city.
Refusal of the corporation to consider applicants as tenants because of race,
color, creed or religion was held not to be "state action" so as to violate the
equal protection clauses of the state or federal constitutions. Arguably, if it
is not permissible to force private apartment owners to rent to undesirable
tenants, then newspaper enterprises should not have to devote their
privately owned resources to the dissemination of unwanted opinions.
However, Congress has rejected the homeowner-private property argu-
ment with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968," and the
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statutory pref-
erence accorded civil rights vis-a-vis property rights. Perhaps newspapers
should shoulder the responsibility of expressing various types of ideas,
just as homeowners must now sell to the first bona fide purchaser.
Moreover, on a policy level the distinction between government and
private bodies becomes increasingly blurred when one considers recent
litigation brought to force newspapers published at state universities to
print political advertisements.'
Counterbalancing Recent Decisions
Decisions in the area of newspaper liability for libel or invasion
of privacy offer further justification for imposing greater responsibilities
on newspapers to print diverse opinions. Those whose points of view are
15. Wolin, for example, held that the public character of the terminal-the ready
access to its facilities, its creation pursuant to a compact between two states-fulfilled
the requisites of state action. 392 F.2d at 88.
16. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
17. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804 (Apr. 11, 1968). See also Jones v. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968): Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1982 (1964) banning all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, is a valid exercise of Congress' power to enforce
the thirteenth amendment.
The commerce clause has been used to justify recent civil rights legislation and
would appear to support equally well federal regulation of the press.
18. An action has recently been filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin alleging that the student newspaper published by the
Whitewater Division of the Wisconsin State University adopted a policy of refusing
all political advertisements after it began to receive demands to publish advertisements
condemning the Vietnam war. The plaintiffs have asserted that a portion of the
student activities fee collected by the State University from each student is used to
support the publication. The newspaper also receives revenue from commercial advertis-
ing. The decision to ban political matter appears to have been made by University
officials, and the Board of Regents of State Colleges was named as a defendant. Lee v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, Civil No.-, (W.D. Wis., filed Apr. 16, 1968).
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accepted and published by newspapers have been given great freedom to
express their point of view." Now that the press has been fortified with
heavy protection from libel litigation, it seems only just that all parties
should have an opportunity to respond. If not, recent decisions will have
the ironic result of inhibiting rather than promoting free speech.2"
Newspapers and the "Quasi-Public" Concept
In addition to these policy reasons for imposing greater responsi-
bilities on allegedly private enterprises, the link between newspapers and
the public interest may be seen clearly in the light of the "quasi-public"
concept formulated in Marsh v. Alabama."' The court, in overturning
a conviction against a member of Jehovah's Witnesses who was dis-
tributing literature on a company-owned sidewalk in a company-owned
town, stated: "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it."2
In its most recent decision in this area, the Court has applied the
"quasi-public" doctrine to privately-owned shopping centers. Amalga.
mated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,2"
held that a Pennsylvania state court injunction limiting peaceful picket-
ing of a business located within a privately-owned shopping center to
berm areas and prohibiting picketing in the store's pick-up zone and
parking lot violated the first amendment. Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking
for the Court, noted that the present case was distinguishable from Marsh
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964): public official must
prove "actual malice" in order to recover. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964):
even though an accusation might affect an individual privately, "anything which might
touch on an official's fitness for office" is protected unless "actual malice" could be
shown. 379 U.S. at 77. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966): public official includes
"those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public
to have substantial responsibility for, or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs." 383 U.S. at 85. Curtis v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) : first amendment protection on freedom of the press applies to "public figures"
as well as to "public officials."
20. The irony of Times and its progeny lies in the unexamined assumption
that reducing newspaper exposure to libel litigation will remove restraints on
expression and lead to an 'informed society.' But in fact the decision creates a
new imbalance in the communications process. Purporting to deepen the con-
stitutional guarantee of full expression, the actual effect of the decision is to
perpetuate the freedom of a few in a manner adverse to the public interest in
uninhibited debate. Unless the Times doctrine is deepened to require oppor-
tunities for the public figure to reply to a defamatory attack, the Times
decision will merely serve to equip the press with some new and rather
heavy artillery which can crush as well as stimulate debate.
Barron, supra note 1, at 1657.
21. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
22. 326 U.S. at 506.
23. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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as the petitioners were not totally denied access to the community. How-
ever, this fact was held not to be determinative.
We see no reason why access to a business district in a
company town for the purpose of exercising first amendment
rights should be constitutionally required, while access for the
same purpose to property functioning as a business district
should be limited simply because the property surrounding the
"business district" is not under the same ownership. Here the
roadways provided for vehicular movement within the mall
and the sidewalks leading from building to building are the
functional equivalents of the streets and sidewalks of a normal
municipal business district. The shopping center premises are
open to the public to the same extent as the commercial center
of a normal town.24
Mr. Justice Marshall stated that the decision did not mean that shopping
centers were now to be treated like municipalities, but that freedom of
expression could not be abridged in a community business block.25
Mr. Justice Black, in a vigorous dissent, also found the issue
presented to be under what circumstances private property can be treated
as though it were public, but contended that the majority misread
Marsh, since "the answer that Marsh gives is [that the property must
have] taken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., 'residential buildings,
streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a business block on
which business places are situated.' 26
The decisions in Marsh and Logan seem consonant with the up-
holding of freedom of expression in Kissinger and Wolin.2 1 Private
shopping centers, dealing with the public at large on a nondiscriminatory
basis, seem closely analogous to public subway stations. It is submitted
that if expression of public issues within the confines of the first amend-
ment must now be permitted in these areas, newspapers actively engaged
in the discussion of public issues should be deemed "quasi-public"
enterprises and required to deal with the public at large on a non-
discriminatory basis. Arguably, Mr. Justice Black could agree with this
result as a logical adjunct to Marsh. In Marsh, expression of ideas
entailed access to the property of the company-owned town. Analogically,
the only feasible means of effectively presenting and countering pre-
viously-voiced opinions to the community at large is through the same
medium-the community newspaper.
24. Id. at 319.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 332, quoting Marsh.
27. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
228
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STATUTORY CREATION OF DUTY
Not only may private property rights be constitutionally abridged
under certain circumstances, but policy considerations necessitate the
regulation of private monopolies for the public good.
"State Action"
One final obstacle in the creation of a right of access to the press is
that Kissinger, Niemotko, Wolin, Marsh and Logan may all be inter-
preted as a negative prohibition against state interference with first
amendment rights which does not entail any affirmative duties.28
Before the enactment of the 1968 Civil Rights Act and the Court's
decision in Jones v. Mayer, if state action was not involved, a refusal by
private homeowners to sell or rent because of race, color, creed, or
religion was permissible. These recent developments have demonstrated
that in the absence of state action the civil rights of an individual may
be superior to another individual's property rights. As an individual
seeking a "right of access" to a newspaper is faced with the hurdle
provided by the state action requirement, it is submitted that legislation
should be enacted to implement the freedom of the press clause of the
first amendment, as has been done in the case of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, in so doing, Congress
would have either to equate an individual's first amendment rights with
his civil rights or at least recognize that his first amendment rights are
superior to another individual's property rights. Opponents of applying
this rationale to newspapers contend that our society places high value
on a free press, and its right to exercise private discretion should not be
judicially or legislatively circumscribed. As a theoretical justification this
argument is unimpeachable, if the result is a free interchange of political
ideas. On the other hand, if freedom of the press signifies the suppression
of unpopular views, as often seems to be the situation at present, then
governmental intervention is clearly warranted, not as a restriction on
existing news coverage, but as an expansion and stimulus to debate.
Present Newspaper Regulation
Regulation of monopolies in wire services has been the extent of
statutory control over newspapers. Associated Press by-laws allowing
members to prohibit the sale of news to non-AP members and to block
the admission of new members has been held to be a combination and
conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the states and an
28. Perhaps the most famous "state action" case, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), has been interpreted in this manner. See, e.g., Lewis, The Meaning of State
Action, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 1083 (1960).
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attempt to monopolize a part of that trade in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 9 The Court specifically stated that the decision was not
an application of the "public utility" concept to the newspaper business,"0
although Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion" and Mr.
Justice Roberts dissenting 2 thought otherwise. Mr. Justice Black, writ-
ing for the Court, reasoned that imposition of restraints on first amend-
ment expression necessitated affirmative governmental action:
[The first] amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that
a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command
that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge
if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed
freedom. . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publish-
ing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental inter-
ference under the first amendment does not sanction repression
of the freedom by private interests."3
Also, in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,34 the Court upheld an
injunction3 which prevented a newspaper, desiring to monopolize ad-
vertising and news channels, from destroying a radio station by re-
fusing to publish advertisements for local merchants who advertised
through the radio station. It seems anomalous that the need for free
interchange of economic commodities has justified very broad and intricate
legislative intervention which clearly infringes the "rights" of some to
conduct their affairs as they please while the exchange of ideas remains
shackled by archaic notions of individual rights. The antitrust laws are
sui generis because they seek only to implement policies created by express
statutory language, viz., destruction of monopoly and promotion of free
competition; nonetheless, the Court went a long way toward implementing
a first amendment right.3"
29. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id. at 20.
34. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
35. The injunction's basic thrust was to restrain Lorain from refusing to accept
for publication any advertisement because the advertiser proposed to utilize other
advertising media.
36. See Bork, The Ride of Reaso, and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 828 (1965) :
The Brandeis tradition may be described as the inclination on the part of
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Newspapers and the FCC
Regulation of broadcasting has been legitimatized,87 but in a thirty-
five year old decision, without giving any reasons to justify its result,
one court held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 does not
apply to communications published in newspapers, but only to those
transmitted by wire or radio.8 The rationale which has since been most
often propounded for the distinction drawn between broadcasting and
newspapers is that broadcasting by its very nature-since its facilities
must be restricted to prevent a station from using another's frequency
and since the available frequencies must be rationed-is inherently more
susceptible to government regulation. 9 However, arguing that broad-
casting is more susceptible to regulation evades the question of whether
newspapers should be regulated.
It appears that the "fairness" doctrine,4" providing equal oppor-
tunities for expression, should be applicable to newspapers as well as
broadcasting. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
recently upheld the doctrine. 1 However, in Radio Television News
Directors Association v. United States,42 the FCC's "personal attack"
rules, requiring the radio station to notify the person or group attacked
and offer a reasonable opportunity to respond, have been invalidated by
some courts to consider a very broad range of values, even non-economic
values, in the decision of antitrust cases. Conspicuous examples of this [are]
Judge Learned Hand's opinion applying first amendment considerations
through the Sherman Act in Associated Press, and Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in the Supreme Court.
37. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), upholding
Federal Communications Act of 1934, derived from the Federal Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, 44 Stat. 1162, now 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
38. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Wash. 1934), rev'd
and temporary injunction granted, 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on jurisdictional
grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
39. See Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002
(7th Cir. 1968), and Barron, In Defense of Fairness: A First Amendment Rationale for
Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 CAIn. L. Rxv. 31 (1964).
40. § 315 (a) of Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964):
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Prozided, that such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate....
41. 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 600,
1967 Term; renumbered No. 2, 1968 Term). Belittling remarks concerning author Fred
J. Cook were made by the Reverend Billy James Hargis on his program series, The
Christian Crusade. Mr. Cook wrote and requested equal time, to be furnished at the
expense of WGCB. The FCC held that free time must be furnished to Cook, if he is
unwilling to pay and sponsorship cannot be obtained.
42. 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968).
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the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court strongly hinted that the
"fairness" doctrine might be unconstitutional, although the decision did
not require that issue to be reached. 3 The justification for the latter
decision is that the requirement of personal notification inhibits dis-
cussion of controversial issues, which would imply that the basic premise
of the "fairness" doctrine-a balanced presentation-is not being ques-
tioned. Moreover, it is in this context that the most fundamental element
of the question of newspaper regulation may be seen most clearly. As
recent events graphically illustrate, to force a speaker at a public gathering
or a speaker employing broadcast media to devote a portion of the time
available to a proponent of an opposite view restricts the time available
for his own presentation, and most importantly, the difficulty of resolving
such issues as precisely which factions are entitled to representation and
by whom may well preclude anyone's speaking.4 Patently, adding pages
to a newspaper raises significantly fewer difficulties. Proper cognizance
of these mechanical realities leads to the surest refutation of the averment
that to foist upon newspapers the views of third parties is to abridge
their first amendment rights; simply requiring a newspaper to accept
political advertisements in no way impedes presentation of the news-
paper's editorial viewpoint. Thus the implications raised in Radio
Television News Directors as to the possible unconstitutionality of the
abridgment of speech inherent in the difficulty of implementing the fair-
ness rules need have no application to newspapers. 5
LImITS AND EXTENT OF DUTY
If the duty to accept advertisements is imposed on newspapers,
minimal standards must be promulgated to forestall the inundation of
newspapers with unprintable matter.
Political-Commercial Distinction
Presently, newspapers have the right to reject both political and
commercial advertisements." To espouse abolition of discretion as to the
former practice is not to challenge the latter. This result would harmonize
with the previously discussed decisions concerning the first amendment
43. "We are not prepared to hold the fairness doctrine unconstitutional." 400
F.2d at 1018.
44. For example, the difficulty of arranging for participation of minority group
candidates was raised as a major issue in the controversy over scheduling a debate
between major party Presidential candidates in 1968.
45. Id. The court began with the premise that newspapers could not be regulated
and proceeded to note the similarities between newspapers and broadcasting. Cf. Note,
The Federal Communications Conmission's Fairness Regulations: A First Step Toward
Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass Media, 54 CORN. L. REv. 294 (1969), where
it is argued that an affirmative right of access to broadcast media should be created.
46. Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W2d 241 (1968).
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as well as with very recent court approvals of the traditional rule as to
commercial matter. Existing statutes, such as the antitrust laws, do
provide relief from some of the more egregiously unfair commercial
practices."
Commentators generally agree that "[t]he notion that commercial
advertising is not protected by the first amendment has been enshrined
among the commonplaces of constitutional law."' For example in setting
the boundaries of the obscenity standard, the Supreme Court has
examined the framework of the questionable material. The Court's
confusing opinion in Ginzburg v. United States" has been interpreted
as an assertion that certain books violated the obscenity standard not
because they were obscene per se, but because they were distributed
"against a background of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for
the sake of their prurient appeal.""0 Also municipal prohibition of the
distribution of commercial handbills does not abridge freedom of speech,
even when one side of a handbill is devoted to public issues.5 ' Moreover,
in its widely publicized decision on libel of public figures, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Court noted that the first amendment
applied since the advertisement at issue was not a commercial one.5
Cogent policy reasons underlie the courts' concern with the character
of the advertisement. 4 Dissemination of "false" political ideas serves a
socially useful purpose not present in false claims by manufacturers
advertising their products. In the commercial marketplace false assertions
are likely only to breed more false assertions from competitors with no
47. See text at notes 29-36 supra.
48. Developments in the Law--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1005,
1027 (1967). See also cases cited therein.
49. 383 U.S. 403 (1966).
50. Id. at 466. But cf. Dyson, Looking-Glass Law: An Analysis of the Ginsburg
Case, 28 U. PrT. L. REv. 1 (1966), contending that Ginzburg was convicted not for the
distribution of obscene matter, but for the obscene distribution of matter. It is argued
that Ginzburg does not stand for the proposition that the obscenity of material may bejudged by the way it is advertised, since the decision did not label the material obscene.
Instead, the case holds that one who promotes distribution by emphasizing the sexually
provocative aspects of the publication is later estopped to deny his prior assertions
in an action for "pandering."
51. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The court held that provisions
of the Sanitary Code forbidding distribution in the streets of commercial and business
advertising matter could not be sidestepped by printing a double-sided handbill with one
side devoted to "public protest" and the other to commercial advertising.
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See discussion at note 19 supra.
53. The publication was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense
in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information,
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern.
Id. at 266.
54. For a good discussion of this area see Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, 80 HAv. L. Rav. 1005 (1967).
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corresponding improvements in the products sold. On the other hand,
expression of political opinion is likely to inspire discussion which can
lead to further clarifications and thus be an impetus to progress or
reform." Furthermore, assertions about the virtues of a product are
capable of empirical verification, unlike political assertions which often
expound a normative standard rather than empirically demonstrable
truths." As John Stuart Mill appropriately stated:
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of opinion
is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the
existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion still
more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if
wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error.5
Reasonable Regulations
One way of controlling both the number and content of advertise-
ments would be by reasonable regulations, framed against a constitutional
background. In Kissinger, the court touched on this issue:
Even if the authority and the advertising company are
required to accept the posters for display, however, it does
not follow that others must be accepted, and, in addition, the
authority and advertising company could impose reasonable
regulations on the display of plaintiff's posters and others of a
similar nature as to the number to be displayed and the time and
place for their display.5
First amendment freedoms have been circumscribed by various
concepts such as "clear and present danger,"5 "balancing of competing
55. Id. at 1030.
56. Id. at 1031.
57. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 474, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 932 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY).
58. 274 F. Supp. 438, 443 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
59. Speech is protected unless it is of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that it will bring about substantive evils which the federal or state
legislatures have a right to prevent. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950) ; Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic
upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace or
order appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally
obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free communication of views,
religious or otherwise, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.
Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
308 (1940).
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interests"6 and other tests.61 Breard v. City of Alexandrid' held that an
ordinance forbidding peddlers to call upon private residences without an
invitation does not interfere with interstate commerce or deny freedom
of the press. While the case may be contended to have turned upon the
fact that admitting unwanted intruders could lead to robbery or worse,
the Court stressed the homeowner's right of privacy. Similarly, Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,6 3
involved regulations promulgated by the owner of a housing development
prohibiting entry of any apartment building for the purpose of can-
vassing, peddling, soliciting contributions or distributing literature except
upon written consent or invitation of a tenant previously furnished to the
manager. The plaintiffs, members of Jehovah's Witnesses, argued that
such restrictions were a violation of their freedom of speech, and that
they had an absolute right, despite the regulations, to go at will through
the apartment buildings to propagate their religious beliefs. The court
upheld the restrictions as validly leaving the determination up to each
individual tenant. Also, Kovacs v. Cooper64 upheld a statute which
banned sound trucks broadcasting items of public interest from the
public streets when amplified to a loud and raucous noise level. Just as
homeowners are entitled to be free of missionaries intruding or messages
blaring into their homes, newspaper subscribers should have the right
not to be besieged by advertisements in poor taste under anyone's
standards. 5
On balance it would seem that if a newspaper must accept advertise-
ments it should not then be exculpated from all responsibilities for their
content no matter how irresponsible or inflammatory, especially in light
of the fact that the young are exposed to newspapers. At present, when
discussing "public officials" or "public figures" newspapers are only
liable if "actual malice" is shown, and this protection could be extended
60. Freedom of speech and press are not absolute rights, and the validity of a
statute under the first amendment depends upon a balancing of competing interests.
Shelton v. Tucker, 374 U.S. 479 (1960).
61. As many as five different first amendment formulations can be found: the
"bad tendency" test, the "clear and present danger" test, the "ad hoc balancing" test,
the "absolute" test, and the "definitional balancing" test. For theoretical discussions see
Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) ;
Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).
62. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). The Court reached the same result in Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1942).
63. 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948).
64. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
65. Access to advertise one's political convictions, for example, should not confer
the right to depict brutal war scenes.
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to include good faith defamatory errors"' as well as to errors in publishing
or excluding subversive or obscene matter. This balance would be appro-
priate, for as Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the court in Farmer's
Education & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., stated:
The decision a broadcasting station would have to make
in censoring libelous discussion by a candidate is far from easy.
Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear. Whether
such a statement is actionably libelous is an even more complex
question, involving as it does, consideration of various legal
defenses such as 'truth' and the privilege of fair comments.
Such issues have always troubled courts. Yet, under petitioner's
view of the statute they would have to be resolved by an
individual licensee during the stress of a political campaign,
often, necessarily, without adequate consideration or basis for
decision. Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible for
the broadcast of libelous material, all remarks even faintly
objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution.
Moreover, if any censorship were permissible, a station so
inclined could intentionally inhibit a candidate's legitimate
presentation under the guise of lawful censorship of libelous
matter. Because of the time limitation inherent in a political
campaign, erroneous decisions by a station could not be cor-
rected by the courts promptly enough to permit the candidate
to bring improperly excluded matter before the public. It follows
from all this that allowing censorship, even of the attenuated
type advocated here, would almost inevitably force a candidate
to avoid controversial issues during political debates over
radio and television, and hence restrict the coverage of con-
sideration relevant to intelligent political decisions."
Regulations must also be promulgated covering rates and policies
as to disclosure of the author of the advertisement. Rates should be kept
at a minimum consistent with space and expense in order that the poor
as well as the rich may receive a forum. It has been held that establishing
the commercial advertising rate as a maximum rate for political advertise-
66. See Note, The Scope of First Anendinent Protection for Good-Faith Defa-
matory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642 (1966).
67. 360 U.S. 525 (1959) : The Court held that § 315 of the Federal Communications
Act providing for equal time for political candidates and prohibiting censorship, forbids
the station to delete libelous material and immunizes the station from libel actions under
state laws.
68. Id. at 530.
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ments in newspapers does not abridge freedom of the press.69 If litigation
currently underway to establish that such publications as newspapers
published by state-run universities are "publicly" operated"0 proves
successful, then arguably the precepts of Murdock z. Pennsylvdnia7'
should restrict their rates to no more than recoupment of cost.
As for the identification problem, Talley v. California"2 seems to
stand for the proposition that requiring the sponsor's signature is an
unconstitutional abridgment of free speech. This case involved a Los
Angeles city ordinance prohibiting distribution, in any place under any
circumstances, of handbills which did not have printed on them the
names and addresses of persons who prepared, distributed or sponsored
them. The ordinance was justified on the grounds that it was aimed at
the prevention of "fraud, deceit, false advertising, negligent use of words,
obscenity and libel."73 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, found
that fear of reprisals might deter peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred on the grounds that the
ordinance was not limited on its face to the matters cited by the city, but
implied that under such limitations the ordinance would be acceptable.
Justices Clark, Frankfurter, and Whittaker dissented on the grounds that
freedom of speech does not guarantee the right of anonymity. The
justification for ordinances of this type is that one who prints must
identify himself in the same manner as one who speaks from a public
platform. Justice Harlan's approach seems most appropriate: identifiable
state policies will often necessitate disclosure.'4
Periodicals Excluded
Any rule requiring the right of access to daily newspapers should
69. Chronicle & Gazette Pub. Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478
(1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690 (1947).
70. See note 18 supra.
71. 319 U.S. 105 (1942). The Court held in violation of the first amendment a
municipality's licensing tax on canvassers as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses whose
activities might have been curtailed by the expense.
72. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
73. Id. at 66.
74. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958): a court order requiring dis-
closure of the NAACP's membership list was ruled a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The purpose of the production order, to determine
whether petitioner was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama
foreign corporation registration statute, did not outweigh the likelihood of possible
"economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion and other mani-
festations of public hostility." Id. at 462. Furthermore, officers of the NAACP had no
objection to divulging their identity, thereby satisfying the purposes of the statute.
Although state policies here did not justify disclosure, prevention of fraudulent
and obscene advertisements is a sufficient rationale for requiring identification.
Requiring sponsors of advertisements to identify themselves would probably reduce the
number of irresponsible and factually inaccurate advertisements submitted.
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not apply to scholarly journals or opinion magazines, such as The New
Republic or The National Review or to such essentially propagandistic
papers as The Daily Worker, as these periodicals make no claim to
unbiased reporting. Furthermore, these types of publications span the
political ideological spectrum, and refutation of "liberal" arguments may
be found in "conservative" periodicals. On the other hand, monopoly
newspapers in a small community are often the only effective means of
communication on matters of local concern, and denial of access here
often results in an effective stifling of debate.75 It would seem that even
weekly newsmagazines should be excluded on the grounds that the
publishers are seeking to offer the public an integrally designed total
package aimed at a less broad audience that of newspapers. While this
distinction is one of degree it is bolstered by the empirical observation
that newspapers presently publish a wider variety of advertisements
than most magazines. The courts have recently upheld the right of
magazines and law reviews to refuse to print political matter."6
REMEDY
One possible remedy would be to allow a rejected advertiser an
action in tort against the offending newspaper. However, cases 77 that
have already utilized the tort action have not been successful, since
newspapers have no duty to serve without discrimination."8 If, however,
75. See discussion at note 3 supra.
76. Avins v. Rutgers State University, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968), involved the rejection of an article submitted for publication in the
Rutgers Law Review. The article reviewed the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 as it pertained to school desegregation, concluding that the United States
Supreme Court had erred in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In his letter
of rejection the articles editor of the Review stated that "approaching the problem from
the point of view of legislative history alone is insufficient." 385 F.2d at 152. Avins
asserted that the editors of the Review had discriminated by accepting articles
reflecting a "liberal" jurisprudential outlook in constitutional law, an outlook which
rejects the primacy of legislative history and the intent of the founding fathers. Avins
asserted that his article was rejected solely because of its conservative approach, thereby
violating his free speech rights. The court, in affirming the trial judge's granting of
summary judgment for the defendants, held that free speech does not give the right to
speak on any subject at any time, and that editors of a law review must necessarily
have broad discretion. See also, Mid-West Elec. Cooperative, Inc. v. West Texas
Chamber of Commerce, 369 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963), where the court
upheld the Chamber's right to refuse to accept an advertisement from an electric
cooperative, a member of the Chamber, on the grounds that it was contrary to political
philosophies of the organization.
77. See, e.g., J.J. Gordon, Inc., v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass.
142, 177 N.E. 2d 586 (1961).
78. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 762 (1938):
One who causes intended or unintended harm to another merely by refusing
to enter a business relation with the other or to continue a business relation
terminable at his will is not liable for the harm ....
The comments following this section give as an example of non-liability in this area
the refusal of a newspaper to accept an advertisement.
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newspapers have a duty statutorily imposed upon them, they could be
liable under a provision analogous to section 763 of the RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS7 0 for a violation of that duty. This type of tort action seems to
offer a greater chance of success than the traditional defamation
remedies."0 However, damages may be hard to prove when the only
harm suffered is repression of political ideas rather than economic
interests, and editors might regard such damages as costs well justified
so long as some ideas remain unprinted.
The ideal remedy would be a mandatory injunction compelling the
newspaper to publish. Where impending events, such as an election,
would make a plaintiff's right of expression moot by the time the issue is
litigated, utilization of interlocutory injunctions, either temporary re-
straining orders or preliminary injunctions,8 would be necessary. Except
for situations such as impending elections where "time is of the essence,"
injunctions will probably be issued only after a full trial.8 2 Interlocutory
mandatory injunctions seldom are utilized,8 and only in circumstances
where necessary to prevent irreparable injury. 4  Furthermore is-
79. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 763 (1939) :
One who engages in a business which carries with it a duty to serve without
discrimination and on proper terms all who request his service and who without
legal excuse refuses so to serve another is liable to the other for the harm
caused thereby.
Of course, the "all" whose duty it would be to serve is the relevant "all" with the
limitations discussed above taken into account.
80. For a list of the various remedies available, e.g., retraction, reply, and the
difficulties with each, see Note, Vindication of the Reputation of A Public Official,
80 H.Av. L. REv. 1730 (1967).
81. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
82. Courts have been hesitant to award preliminary mandatory injunctions, since
the result is a granting of the relief before the issues are fully litigated. In Amalgamated
Furniture Factories v. Rochester Times-Union, 128 Misc. 673, 219 N.Y.S. 705 (1927),
this rationale was followed in denying plaintiff's plea for a preliminary mandatory
injunction to force the defendant newspaper to publish its advertisements under their
contract. The defendant claimed the advertisements were misleading; no affirmative
relief could be granted until this issue was litigated. Winton Motor Carriage Co. v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 196 F. 906 (D. Pa. 1912), held that a weekly magazine could
not be compelled by preliminary mandatory injunction to publish an advertisement
submitted by an auto manufacturer when there was a contract dispute.
In Rose v. Brown, 186 Misc. 553, 58 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1945), a mandatory preliminary
injunction issued compelling a radio station to broadcast programs in compliance with
its contract, since by the time the issue was litigated the broadcast date would have
passed.
83. A mandatory injunction, especially at a preliminary stage of proceedings, is
rarely issued, and only where it is essential to maintain the status quo pending the trial.
Action Bag & Envelope Co. v. Lerner, 218 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1961). Courts do have power
to issue mandatory injunctions where it is necessary to preserve the status quo or to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff. Graham v. Board of Superintendents, 49
Misc. 2d 45, 267 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1966).
84. It has been sometimes said that a mandatory injunction cannot be issued
before the final hearing, and that is generally true, since the purpose of an
interlocutory injunction is merely to preserve the status quo until the rights
of the parties can be determined. But in special circumstances mandatory inter-
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suance requires an extremely clear showing of the rights of the parties
and in any case in which the vague standards of the first amendment
are raised as a defense such a showing is unlikely.
Since a newspaper's determination of whether or not to accept an
advertisement for publication involves consideration of imprecise first
amendment tests and vague defamatory standards with their correspond-
ing intricate legal defenses, 5 newspapers should not be held liable as
long as their decisions concerning publication are in good faith and
reasonable under the circumstances. If we should not hold newspapers
liable for good faith judgments not to publish, neither is it equitable to
force advertisers to undertake court actions seeking an injunction
and/or damages in order to have their advertisements published. To
state that the remedy is not without difficulties, however, is not to state
that we should be without the remedy.
CONCLUSION
Opponents of governmental intervention argue that if any reforms
are needed, an enlightened press should undertake its own policing."
However, portraying publishers as benevolent despots would not seem
to provide the adequate safeguards needed to insure greater access.
Arguably creation of this new right may lead to demagoguery and even
possible violence. On the other hand, possibilities of excess or violence are
not justifications for curbing freedom of expression"1 until there is a
"clear and present danger" of such disorder," and allowing greater
freedom for the expression of opinion may inhibit rather than promote
locutory injunctions have been granted, as where the rights of the parties
are clear....
H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 33 (2d ed. 1948).
85. See the analogous discussion by Mr. Justice Black in discussing defamation in
broadcasting at the text accompanying note 68 supra.
86. See, e.g., Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947).
87. The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope; the authors
of the first amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might dis-
turb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed
essential, if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943).
88. Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for an acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, is
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
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unrest."9 Moreover our greatest danger today seems to be an apathetic
majority.90
Distinguishing political from commercial advertisements and iden-
tifying inflammatory or obscene matter may be difficult in some
cases, but differentiating "public officials" and "public figures" is no less
difficult. Subways, terminal stations and shopping centers now serve as
forums for public expression. The creation of a right of access to news-
papers is long overdue.
William A. Resneck
89. Barron, supra note 1, at 1650:
Ideas are denied admission into media until they are first disseminated in a
way that challenges and disrupts the social order. They then may be discussed
and given notice. But is it not the assumption of a constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression that the process ought to work the other way-that
the idea be given currency first so that its proponents will not conclude that
unrest and violence alone will suffice to capture public attention.
90. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 476, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 934-35 (Sup. Ct.
1962):
The danger of our times is not that we as a people have become aroused
to fever pitch by the excitement of ideas. It is rather by the opposite, that we
as a people have become inert and conformist, that we do not often enough hear
the vital issues of our day, mooted from a public platform.
